The Framers of the American Constitution were substantially influenced by ancient history and classical political theory, as exemplified by their education, the availability of classical readings, and their inculcation in classical republican values. This book explores how the Framing generation deployed classical learning to develop many of the essential structural aspects of the Constitution: federalism, separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, independent courts, and the war-making and foreign relations powers. Also examined are very contemporary constitutional debates for which there were classical inspirations, including: sovereign immunity, executive privilege, line-item vetoes, and the electoral college. Combining techniques of intellectual history, classical studies, and constitutional interpretation, this book makes a unique contribution to our understanding of contemporary constitutionalism.
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PREFACE
Our received wisdom is that the framers of the united
States Constitution were pragmatists, not theorists. Just as importantly, we have come to believe that the American Revolution and the subsequent creation of the American republic marked a definitive break from previous political models and truths, that it well and truly began a modern mode of government of the people, for the people, and by the people. Indeed, some have gone so far to suggest that the Founders knew they were making "a new kind of society that produces a new kind of human being. That human being -confident, self-reliant, tolerant, generous, future-orientedis a vast improvement over the wretched, servile, fatalistic, and intolerant human being that traditional societies have always produced." 1 In short, the political story of the Founding has been turned into the ultimate morality play.
I intend to question this radical and revolutionary construct of the Framing by suggesting a simple, but subversive, idea: that the members of the Framing generation were as much influenced by the political values and experiences of classical antiquity as they were by Enlightenment liberal philosophy and by the exigencies of the struggle against Great Britain. Even more pertinently, I intend to show here that the Framers' use of ancient history (perhaps even more than their reading of classical philosophy) informed their decisions in drafting the Constitution of the United States. More than merely suffusing their general political theories, my thesis is that ancient history guided, in many material respects, the fashioning of the most basic features of our government. Such organizational elements I will call here the "structural Constitution," as distinct from the provisions of our national charter that grants rights to individuals, groups, or civil society in general. governments; bicameralism in Congress; the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; the provision of a strong and vigorous presidency; and the constraint of the war-making and foreign relations powers of the national government. Together these elements define a constitutionalism of limited, but effective, government. Each -as I will argue here -had its roots in classical antiquity, antecedents that the Framers were well aware of and that they fashioned for their own instrumental ends in creating the American republic. I am mindful in writing this book that I am wading into treacherous intellectual waters. Perhaps no political subject has been given as much attention as the mentalité of the Framers and the consequent impact on the Constitution and their historic legacy. Nor has the subject of the Framing generation's inculcation in classical learning gone unnoticed, and it is appropriate for me to reflect at the outset of this project on the significant contributions made to this subject by previous writers. Even with the rediscovery in the 1960s of the influence of republicanism on the Framers, 3 "the extent to which Americans' republican sensibilities derived from Roman [and other ancient] models has often been overlooked by modern scholars whose interests and training lie elsewhere."
4
Most illustrative of this dismissal of the classical tradition in the framing of the Constitution is this gracious passage from Bernard Bailyn's towering work, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution: "The classics of the ancient world are everywhere in the literature of the Revolution, but they are illustrative, not determinative, of thought. They contributed a vivid vocabulary but not the logic or grammar of thought, a universally respected personification but not the source of political and social beliefs."
5 Or, as Russell Kirk put the matter: "America's political institutions owe next to nothing to the ancient world -although American modes of thinking about politics were indeed influenced, two centuries ago, by Greek and Roman philosophers long dead."
6 But perhaps Clinton Rossiter put the sharpest point on the proposition: "Most [American revolutionary and early republic] authors used the ancient Greeks for window dressing. . . . Americans would have believed just as vigorously in public morality had Cato and the Gracchi never lived."
7 Central to this vision of the intellectual basis of the Founding was the primacy of Enlightenment rationalism and political pragmatism over all competing influences, whether classical antiquity, the common law, or Protestant theology.
8 Indeed, it may be properly suggested that the contemporary dismissal of the Framing's classical debts is attributable to either a willful refusal to recognize that the Framers had a very different cultural construct than we have today, or that it is somehow improvident to believe that Preface xi they were motivated by anything other than Enlightenment ideals.
9 And although one might err in believing that ancient history provided direct and linear inspiration for the Framers' political judgments in crafting the Constitution, 10 it would be safer to give the classical tradition its due. The crux of this book's approach to intellectual history is to take the Framers at face value in their speeches and writings -to let them speak for themselves (sometimes at great length, given the rhetorical styles of their day 11 ) when they make use of classical idioms to explain and amplify the political considerations in drafting the Constitution. This does not mean that we are obliged to assume that the Framing generation had a perfect understanding of ancient history. Indeed, they did not. One of the contributions that this book hopes to make is to assess -based on modern archaeology, philology, and historiography -the actual operation of the constitutions of ancient polities and republics and thereby better appreciate how the Framers used and abused the historical evidence then at their disposal. For some writers on this subject, the classics are merely a window onto the intellect of the Framers; for them, the underlying ancient history really does not -and cannot -matter. I prefer to reverse the polarity of this assumption and evaluate the ancient tradition of constitution-making in its own right while considering the practical impact that tradition has had on American constitutional practice.
The last significant confession that has to be made at the outset of this book is that it comes from the mind of an academic lawyer. Although the intellectual history charted here is significant, it does not exist for its own sake. Rather, as someone who has combined the disciplines of law and classics in previous volumes, 12 my preoccupation is with the impact of classical philosophy and ancient history on constitutional text and doctrine. And although the first part of this book is concerned with making the (relatively easy) case of demonstrating the classical predilections of the Framing generation (in Chapter 1 ) and the impact of ancient political models on the Framers (Chapter 2), the balance of this book quickly turns to more lawyerly pursuits.
In the Chapters 3 and 4, my objective is to chart a terra incognitae in the legal literature: the Framers' original intent -as based on their use of ancient history -in drafting various textual provisions of the structural constitution. Although the dangers of originalism in constitutional interpretation are notorious, 13 I am willing to accept for the purposes of writing this book that it remains a potent, if not the preeminent, approach to constitutional discourse in the United States. In pursuing this mission, I intend to look at two sets of constitutional controversies. The first (considered
